With the signi…cant increase in foreign presence in Eastern Europe, linkages across European banking systems have grown markedly. This paper aims at identifyng potential risk of cross-border contagion using a sample of large Western and Eastern European banks. We assume that contagion risk is associated with extreme co-movements in a market-based measure of bank soundness, controlling for underlying common factors. We …nd evidence that contagion risk across European banks heightened signi…cantly during the recent crisis. Contagion among Western European banks with the highest market share in Eastern Europe and from this group to Eastern European banks shows the largest increase in our sample. We …nd also evidence of contagion spreading from Eastern European banks, but this e¤ect seems to re ‡ect a broader phenomenon of contagion from emerging markets to banks in advanced countries exposed to these markets. JEL classi…cation: G21, G15, C12.
Introduction
Contagion is widely perceived to be an important element of banking crises and systemic risk. With the signi…cant increase in foreign presence in Eastern Europe (EE), 1 interlinkages among Western and Eastern European banking systems have grown markedly. Large and growing international …nancial linkages have raised susceptibility to contagion for the host countries, as well as the home countries of the foreign banks active in many EE countries. This paper is intended to contribute to a better understanding of the degree to which European banking systems have become interconnected and how banking problems could spread across borders. In particular, its aim is to identify potential risk of cross-border contagion among the banking sectors of Western and Eastern European countries, using information captured in banks'stock prices and …nancial statements.
We use the distance to default as a comprehensive measure of a bank's default risk. Being a market-based measure of distress, the distance to default has the advantage of including the expectations of market participants and therefore it is forward looking. Moreover, information from security prices helps to deal with data limitations and imperfect knowledge about indirect exposures across …nancial institutions, connected, for example, to the use of similar investment strategies.
We assume that contagion risk is associated with extreme co-movements in banks soundness and we focus on the behavior of the left tail of the distribution of the change in the distance to default. More speci…cally, we estimate the probability of one bank experiencing a large negative shock following large negative shocks in other banks in the sample, after controlling for common (country speci…c and global) factors.
We use a dataset of daily distance to default of 33 European listed banks. Our data sample comprises most of the largest banks operating in Eastern Europe, the Western European banking groups which, through their branches and subsidiaries, own the highest market share in the EE banking systems and the remaining largest, and globally systemic, European banking groups.
The approach applied in this paper builds on a recent body of literature which uses a similar methodology to estimate cross-border contagion (ChanLau, Mitra and Ong, 2007, µ Cihák and Ong, 2007, Gropp, Lo Duca, Vesala, 2010). We extend previous research on the transmission of shocks among banks and banking systems in the following directions: 1) We test for contagion risk among banks in EE and the largest Western European banking groups, some of which operate in Eastern Europe. To our knowledge, this is the …rst comprehensive attempt to measure contagion among banking systems in the two regions.
2) We provide new evidence of how contagion risks in European banking systems evolved in the recent global …nancial crisis (i.e. after the summer of 2007). 2 3) We introduce a test to evaluate whether changes in contagion e¤ects across time and regions are signi…cant.
4) To control for broader contagion from emerging markets, we carry out a counterfactual experiment, comparing our model's results to those obtained substituting a sample of Latin American banks to the Eastern European one.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section describes various potential sources of contagion between Western and Eastern European banking systems. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the methodology and the input data. Section 5 shows estimation results and discusses a few issues related to the robustness of our …ndings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Potential Sources of Contagion between Western and Eastern European Banking Systems
In this paper the term contagion is taken to mean the transmission of an idiosyncratic shock a¤ecting one bank to other banks or banking sectors. De…ned in this way, contagion is included in the broader concept of a systemic crisis, which may be the result of either contagion or common shocks a¤ecting all banks symmetrically and simultaneously. There exist several avenues through which a bank failure may spread to other banks, as contagion may result from direct linkages connecting banks or informational externalities (for a survey of the theoretical literature see Moheeput, 2008 , and Allen, Babus and Carletti, 2009). 3 Direct linkages may take the form of contractual arrangements, such as the cross-holding of deposits or loans in the interbank market. Interbank exposures may create problems if aggregate liquidity provision is insu¢ cient and banks try to avoid liquidation of their long-term assets liquidating their claims on other banks (possibly in other regions). A …nancial crisis in one region could then spread by contagion to other regions and thereby introduce liquidity problems in the latter. Without interlinkages between banks operating in di¤erent regions, the …nancial crisis would not spread between regions (Allen and Gale, 2000) . Direct linkages may also take less explicit forms, such as those arising from payments and settlements infrastructures, asset prices or common investors.
Informational spillovers through market expectations represent a second potential channel for contagion. For example, if banks' fundamentals are believed to be correlated, bad news on one bank may lead investors in another bank to change their perception of its soundness. This may be the case of banks sharing similar business and geographic strategies or operating in the same region. In Archarya and Yorulmazer (2008) the return to bank loans has two components, a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component, and depositors can only observe the overall realisation of bank loan returns, but not the actual decomposition. Hence, a banks'poor performance spills over into other banks'borrowing costs.
Since the beginning of the decade banking systems in EE have been closely integrating with the rest of Europe. Currently, most EE economies are highly dependent on Western European banks, either directly, via crossborder credit extended by headquarters to bank and non-bank residents in the region, or through the activity of local branches and subsidiaries. According to BIS data, at end-2008 outstanding consolidated foreign claims (cross-border claims and local claims of foreign a¢ liates) on non-banks were equivalent, on average, to about 42 per cent of total cross-border and domestic credit to non-banks in EE, even though the magnitude of the exposure varied signi…cantly across countries. Austria, Germany, and Italy accounted for the largest share of foreign claims on the region as a whole, with the notable exception of the Baltics, where claims were mainly held by Swedish banks. A few EE economies had relatively more diversi…ed sources of funds ( Table 1) .
The high exposure of EE banking systems re ‡ects the strong presence of foreign intermediaries in domestic markets, as the share of foreign owned banks account for the bulk of the banking system assets in many countries. Moreover, given the high degree of foreign ownership, and the relatively undeveloped state of domestic capital markets, banks in EE have been increasingly relying on external funding sources (mostly syndicated loans or parent support) to …nance their operations. On average, cross-border claims on banks in EE were equivalent to 17 per cent of total banking liabilities at the end of 2008, but for some countries foreign funding played a bigger role, in particular in the Baltics, in Romania and, to a lesser extent, in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia.
For EE subsidiaries the importance of funding in wholesale international interbank markets is generally small if compared to parent bank …nancing and syndicated lending, since the latter source of funding is more expensive for the subsidiary, given the risk premia and counterparty risks. Therefore, the wholesale interbank market does not seem to be a major channel of cross-border contagion in the case of EE banks, even though it may be not negligible in some banking systems, for instance in Russia (Árvai, Driessen and Öcker-Robe, 2009).
Banking systems that are heavily dependent on foreign funding may face a shortfall of (or more costly access to) funds in case of a sudden reassessment of exposure to the host country due to concerns about vulnerabilities in that country or in the region. Moreover, while reputational risks and longterm business strategy may make it unlikely for parent banks to withhold support of their a¢ liates, the degree of their support depends on funding conditions in home markets, and may be limited if these conditions have become strained.
Problems in a host country may also result in liquidity or solvency pressures for the home country banking system, provided that the exposure to the former is substantial. The magnitude of foreign exposure of Western European bank to withhold is on average contained. The share of claims on EE was about 4 per cent of total banking assets in home countries at end-2008. This share was higher for Austria, Sweden and Belgium, while the other countries were less exposed. However, aggregate country-level data may blur relevant linkages across individual banks. In fact, a relatively small set of Western European banking groups have been taking advantage of the high growth potential o¤ered by EE markets, developing a multiplecountry presence in the region and acquiring a signi…cant market shares in a number of countries (Table 2 ). For some of these groups, operations in EE account for a substantial share of their pro…ts as well as of their assets, implying that they could be negatively a¤ected by adverse developments in this region ( Figure 1 ). As these groups have in some cases a systemic relevance in Western European markets and, at the same time, are exposed to several EE countries, a shock a¤ecting one EE country may spread in many directions through these institutions. Indeed, the concentration of the business among few large and niche players may have an ambivalent e¤ect on …nancial stability, as the failure of a particular market participant may a¤ect others more severely and with a greater probability. It does not only impose losses on other institutions, but it can also create doubts about the health of other institutions. In order to analyse these potential sources of contagion, our research relies on a bank-to-bank approach, di¤erently from other empirical papers (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).
Methodology

Measure of default risk
We use the distance to default as a comprehensive measure of a bank's default risk. The distance to default is the number of standard deviations that separates the bank's asset value from the book value of its liabilities (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) . A greater distance to default is associated with a lower probability of distress. Gropp, Vasala and Vulpes (2006) argue that the dis-tance to default is a complete and unbiased (from a supervisory perspective) indicator of bank fragility, because it combines information about market value of assets, earnings expectations, leverage and volatility of assets, thus encompassing the most important determinants of bank default risk, and is not a¤ected by the potential incentives of the stock holders to prefer increased risk taking (unlike e.g. in the case of unadjusted equity returns) or by the presence of explicit or implicit safety nets (unlike e.g. subordinated debt spreads). They show that the distance to default is a good predictor of banks'rating downgrades in developed countries, even though its predictive performance is poorer when closer to default 4 .
Alternatively, probabilities of default derived from Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads might as well be used as a measure of bank's distress risk (Goodhart and Segoviano, 2009 ). However, CDS are not available for most of the Eastern banks included in our sample. In fact, banks in Eastern Europe do not generally issue bonds, so contracts protecting against the default of these obligors are scarcely required.
The derivation of the distance to default (DD) is described in detail in Gropp, Lo Duca and Vasala (2006) and in Chan Lau, Mitra and Ong (2007). Here, we recall it shortly. The distance-to-default (DD) measure is based on the structural valuation model of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) . As equity holders are residual claimants in the …rm since they only get paid after creditors, equity can be expressed as a call option with strike price equal to the face value of debt D and maturity T . At expiration, the value of equity, E T , is given by:
where A T is the asset value of the …rm at expiration. Given the standard assumptions underlying the derivation of the BlackScholes option pricing formula, the DD in period t for the horizon of T years is given by the following formula:
where r is the risk-free rate and A is the asset volatility. Default occurs when the value of the …rm's assets is less than the strike price, that is, when the ratio of the value of assets to debt is less than one. The DD is essentially the number of standard deviations that the …rm value is from the default point.
Calculating DD requires knowing both the asset value and the asset volatility. The required values, however, correspond to the economic values rather than the accounting …gures. In practice assets value and volatility are not observable and must be estimated solving a system of simultaneous equations, 5 using the observable market value of equity capital and the equity price return volatility. 6 To measure contagion, we concentrate on extreme co-movements, rather than examining statistical interdependence for the entire distribution, 7 as the transmission process of shocks across banks may be nonlinear and looking at interdependencies in the tails of the distribution allows the examination of these nonlinearities, as well as a relaxation of the assumption of multivariate normality, which in the case of fat-tailed …nancial market data tend to be violated (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2001; Straetmans, 2000). Gropp and Moerman (2004) show that not only that the distribution of distances to default of individual banks exhibits fat tails, but also that the correlation among banks'distances to default is substantially higher for larger shocks. Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) do the same for emerging-market stock returns. Both papers suggest that it is necessary to examine the tails of the distribution of returns or the distance to default separately from the overall distribution.
For these reasons, in the paper we focus on the tail of the distribution of percentage changes in distance to default, in the spirit of "extreme value theory". In particular, we consider the probability that one bank is in the negative tail of the distribution, given that other banks are in the negative tail as well. 5 To get daily time series of DD for each bank, we have to solve a non-linear system, which also implies the computation of the cumulative normal distribution. We approximated the normal distribution with a high-order polynomial, following Gapen et al (2008), and we implemented a routine in MATLAB to solve the nonlinear equations. 6 The value of equity capital corresponds to the market capitalization of the …rm, equity volatility corresponds to historical equity volatility. In our case, we drew from Datastream and Bloomberg daily market value for each bank starting from 1 January 2002 and we computed 1-year historical equity volatility as E = p 252 d ;where d is the standard deviation of daily returns in the previous year, to reduce noise. The last parameter, the value of liabilities, D, is assumed equal to the face value of total liabilities and the time horizon T is …xed at one year. We calculate D from yearly balance-sheet data; then we interpolate them linearly in order to get a daily estimate. In alternative, in the literature D is sometimes assumed equal to the face value of short-term liabilities plus half the face value of long-term liabilities. 7 Interdependencies of …nancial returns have been traditionally modelled based on correlation analysis (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2001). However, correlation is a measure of dependence in the centre of the distribution, which gives little weight to tail events (i.e., extreme events) when evaluated empirically. Since distress is characterized as a tail event, correlation may not be an appropriate measure of distress dependence when marginal distributions of …nancial assets are non-normal (Goodhart and Segoviano, 2009 ).
We calculate the weekly (5 trading-day) changes in the DD ( DD), on a daily basis, as we assume that extreme events are more signi…cant if they are prolonged, while events that last for only a day are of little concern. In addition, the use of weekly changes reduces "noise" in the data. 8 We identify extreme values or large shocks as the 15 th percentile left tail of the common distribution of the DDs across all banks in each sub-period. 9 The large negative shock (exceedance) for each bank at time t is thus modelled as a binary variable, y, such that:
where T15 is the 15 th percentile threshold in the left tail of the distribution.
In order to derive a feasible distribution of exceedances, we use the empirical distribution of percentage changes in DD ( DD) of all banks in our sample.
Empirical Model
In order to identify contagion e¤ects and the direction of contagion from one bank to others, we employ a binomial logit, following Chan-Lau, Mitra and Ong (2007).
More speci…cally, we estimate the conditional probability that bank y will be in distress at time t conditional on other banks x i (x 6 = y) being in distress at time t 1, after controlling for other country-speci…c and global factors z j . For each bank, we run the following regression:
The parameters represents the sensitivity of bank y to extreme shocks (exceedances) experienced by the same bank in the previous periods (up to 5 8 Daily data also contain a lot of bid-ask bounce and non-synchronous trading e¤ects (e.g. see Karolyi and Stulz, 1996) . 9 The same threshold is used in Duggar and Mitra (2007) . Ideally, a 10 th or even 5 th percentile left tail would capture the very extreme events; however, either cut-o¤ would have resulted in much too few observations for estimations in the second part of this paper, when we consider a shorter time span to study the e¤ect of crisis on contagion mechanism. We have checked that our estimates are robust to the choice of a lower threshold; Tables 12  and 13 show that considering only the 10 th percentile left tail di¤erences from the baseline are in general not statistically signi…cant, with the notable exception of contagion among EE banks. lags 10 ); represents the sensitivity of bank y to extreme shocks experienced by the rest of the banks in the sample during the previous period (x i 6 = y) or in other words, the co-exceedance of shocks to bank y with shocks to other banks in the sample; 11 represents the sensitivity of bank y to "common shocks" z i , i.e. …nancial developments in its own country as well as in global markets. All control variables are also transformed in binomial 1/0 variables (following a similar procedure used for the DDs) so that only extreme common shocks are identi…ed (see, for instance, Boyson et al., 2010) . Control variables are considered exogenous and therefore included at time t: 12 
Mapping risk and testing for cross-border contagion
The focus of our analysis is not on the speci…c nature of linkages between individual banks per se. Rather, we are interested in the risk that an individual bank failure turn into a chain of failures and, potentially, in a systemic crisis. Therefore, starting from a bank-to-bank perspective, we try to map these risks across European banking systems. For this reason, we prefer a time series approach to a panel one. A panel analysis, carried out in few papers (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2000, Fry, 2006 and has the notable advantage of better accounting for common factors underlying shock transmissions, but on the other hand, it only provides evidence of the average contagion within the sample. Instead, we are interested in measuring di¤erences in the intensity and direction of contagion, depending on the source of shocks and the banks a¤ected.
We carry out separate logistic regressions for each single bank in the sample and for each period. Then, we summarize our results to measure contagion among di¤erent subsets of banks, collecting the signi…cant (positive) coe¢ cients in individual regressions and grouping them by each subset. 13 As the maximum number of signi…cant coe¢ cients depends on the number of banks in each subset, we measure contagion as the percentage of 1 0 We include …ve lags of the dependent variable in order to control for any autocorrelation in the residuals that may be induced by the use of overlapping weekly changes in the DD. 1 1 As only one lag co-exedancees are included, we may miss those cases of contagion taking place within one day that would occur if …nancial markets are e¢ cient and incorporate information very quickly (Gropp, Lo Duca, Vesala, 2006). On the other hand, potential simultaneity biases arising from the presence of endogenous variables suggest the use of lagged variables. As shown in Pesaran and Pick (2007), using contemporaneous regressors in this kind of models is likely to bias upward the measure of contagion. 1 2 Details on data and sources can be found in section 4. 1 3 This is basically a meta-analysis' approach, which aims at measuring the e¤ect of a variable on another within a speci…c model/relationship by collecting results from di¤er-ent studies (in our case estimates) and testing for the signi…cance of their overall e¤ect, generally comparing the mean of an experimental group to that of control group. See for instance Rosenthal, R. 
Finally, in order to compare di¤erences in contagion e¤ects both across subsets and over time, we carry out a speci…c test for these percentages. The signi…cance of a variable in a regression can be considered a dichotomous Bernoulli random variable (yes/no). The number (sum) of signi…cant e¤ects or their proportion, assuming that each variable is independent and identically distributed, is then a binomial distribution. 14 Assuming independence between two random variables, a commonly used statistic for testing the di¤erence of proportions is given by Z =
Although this distribution is no longer binomial, we can reasonably use the normal approximation, which is acceptable for n large enough and p far from zero. 15 Equipped with this simple tool, we can test the signi…cance of contagion among groups of banks and evaluate the di¤erences over time, before and during the crisis. 16 We also carried out McNemar's test, a testing procedure used when the two proportions p 1 and p 2 are correlated (Sheskin, 2007) . As expected, all our results are con…rmed with a higher probability. 17 1 4 Let x1 be the number of signi…cant co-exceedances and n1 the number of regressors in a …rst group of banks. Then p1 = ; the proportion of signi…cant co-exceedances, has a binomial distribution with mean p1 and variance p1(1 p1): Similarly, the proportion of the signi…cant co-excedances in a second group of regressions has a binomial distribution with mean p2 and variance p2(1 p2): 1 5 A simple rule of thumb is np and n(1-p) > 5, a condition met in our case. See for instance Sheskin, 2007 . 1 6 We are assuming that signi…cant coe¢ cients are mutually independent from each other. This cannot be the case, however, because coe¢ cients come from regressions which have common regressors. This hypothesis is not restrictive, though, as the test in case of dependent samples would be more powerful at detecting a signi…cant di¤erence in the samples (alternative hypothesis). Hence, our approach can be seen as conservative towards the null hypothesis of no di¤erence in the samples. 1 7 This test is feasible when the two samples are made up of the same units and so we applied it to di¤erences over time. It cannot be used for cross-group comparisons.
Data and descriptive statistics
Our sample is composed of 33 listed European banks. The number of banks included in the sample is the result of a selection based on the need to keep the time span su¢ ciently long and, at the same time, to pick up most of the largest banks operating in EE. 18 The data sample is divided in three subsets. The …rst one (EEB) (Table 3 ). According to these criteria, we have left out all banks in Serbia and Ukraine (as stock prices data are available only since 2006), Estonia (as there are no listed banks) and Latvia (as these banks were in the lower end of the size ranking). The sub-sample of EE banks is composed of 15 banks, including the two largest independent groups in the region (Sberbank and OTP) and 10 subsidiaries of banking groups with headquarters in advanced economies, 5 of which are included in our sample of Western European groups. The other two sub-samples (Table 4) are made up of the 9 Western European banking groups with the highest market shares in the EE banking system (SWG), provided they are listed in a stock exchange over the entire period under analysis, and the 9 remaining largest European banking groups (OWG).
In order to control for shocks a¤ecting the local economy and global markets, we use four variables, drawing on the existing literature on …nancial crisis and contagion. We include the local stock market weekly returns to control for country-speci…c market shocks, the MSCI world price index weekly returns to control for global market shocks, the weekly percentage changes in the implied volatility index (VIX), reported by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, as a proxy of shocks to investors' risk appetite, and the weekly percentage changes in spreads between the three-month U.S. Treasury Bill interest rate and the three-month LIBOR (TED spread), as a proxy for shocks to global funding conditions. In the regressions, control variables are considered exogenous and are included at time t; except for the VIX, which is lagged by one period, to take into account the di¤erence in trading hours between the US and Europe.
After Figure 2 presents the distribution of DDs (we have 39,435 observations in the …rst period and 14,355 in the second period) and the 15th percentile left tail. As expected, the distribution is not normal, with fat tails which include few extreme values. Moreover, in the crisis period there is a shift of the distribution to the left. Figure 3 shows the number of banks experiencing an extreme negative shock at time t, that is the number of exceedances at each date. Looking at the histograms, it is quite evident that tail events in the …rst sub-period are more evenly spread, while in the crisis period they are mostly concentrated in three episodes, and in particular after the collapse of Lehman Brother in September 2008.
By construction, exceedances occur in 15% of all observations in each sub-period. For each sub-set of banks, however, the frequency of exceedances may di¤er. In the …rst period, exceedances are relatively more frequent among EE banks than among SWGs and OWGs (respectively, 18%, 13% and 12% of all observations in each group). This pattern reversed during the crisis, with a prevalence of exceedances among SWGs and OWGs compared to EE banks (20%, 18% and 10%, respectively).
These …gures are useful to shed some light on how the frequencies of exceedances evolve, given the occurrence of at least one shock (i.e. an exceedance) in our sample in the previous period. In particular, if there were not contagion, these frequencies should not be a¤ected by the presence of shocks occurred in the previous period. The ij th entry of Table 5b shows the (conditional) probability of observing at least one shock to a bank in group j in column at time t, given that at least a shock has occurred in a bank in group i in row at time t 1: 20 In both periods, conditional probabilities are much higher than unconditional ones, indicating that shocks tend to spread across banks and regional boundaries. Moreover, shocks seem to be persistent: the probability of a shock continuing much higher than the probability of observing shocks on two consecutive periods if these were independent. For example, in the calm period the empirical probability that a shock in SWG continues is 23%, which is more than 10 times as large as the probability of two consecutive shocks in the same group (0.13*0.13=1.69%). Finally, conditional probabilities in the crisis period are higher and in some case more than double compared to the calm period, with the notable exception of shocks to EEB, which remain broadly unchanged in the two periods. 21 The fact that the probability of a shock tends to increase following a previous shock in another bank indicates that shocks disseminate and may bring about more severe e¤ects over time. However, this preliminary analysis may overestimate contagion, as exceedances could be the result of common shocks a¤ecting several banks at once (such as deteriorating liquidity conditions, shifts in investors' risk aversion, etc.) and for which we do not control for. In addition, probabilities are conditioned on a group of banks at a time, thus assuming independence from the third group of banks left out. Finally, for each group of banks, exceedances are summed over time and across banks, neglecting the fact that they are linked over time by their coming from di¤erent time series, one for each bank. We take into account all these aspects by modelling probability of contagion in a logit model.
Estimation Results
As stated above, we run 33 regressions in each period. From each equation we collect the signi…cant (positive) coe¢ cients, out of all 1,056 coe¢ cients, and we tabulate them by sub-sample of banks and sub-period in Table 6 (baseline model ). 2223 In the calm period (left-hand side of Tables 6), there is some evidence of contagion among all the three groups of banks. 24 This matches with the preliminary evidence we have drawn from the analysis of the transition matrix, where the transmission of extreme negative shocks across banks is not negligible even in the calm period. Moreover, considering the sample as a whole, no subset of banks stands out as a source of contagion, as shown by the percentages in the last column (All banks).
Looking at evidence of contagion for SWGs, it does not appear to be a speci…c source of contagion from both EEB and SWG groups, respectively, due to linkages between the two groups or similar geographic investment strategies. This result seems to be at odds with the strong presence in EE of the specialized banking groups in our sample. A possible explanation is that, at the beginning of the time span considered in our analysis, the weight of EE in SWGs' strategies was fairly modest. More importantly, the calm period was largely characterized by a very strong economic growth in EE countries, and banks operating there made sizable pro…ts without carrying any relevant risk.
By contrast the other sub-sample of large European banks (OWG) shows a relatively high level of contagion coming from banks within the same subset.
EEBs look relatively prone to contagion only from the same group. Summing up, before the crisis contagion risk appears to be concentrated mainly among the largest Western European banking groups. 25 In the period of eased …nancial conditions and solid economic growth up to the summer of 2007, spillovers across banking systems in Western and Eastern Europe were contained. In particular, groups investing in EE were less a¤ected by risks in their operation in the region, possibly as, owing to the stable and high returns realized in these banking markets, the market reaction to negative news was more subdued.
This pattern, however, changed following the outburst of the international …nancial crisis.
Our results for the crisis period are summarized in the right-hand side of Tables 6. In addition, in Table 8 we show the results of a test of signi…cance of the di¤erences in contagion risks between the crisis and the calm periods.
The main results are summed up below. Overall, there is a more than twofold increase in contagion risk in our sample compared to the calm period (from 9.8 to 20.9% of signi…cant coexceendances on average). Contagion e¤ects rise for all bank groups, within each subset and between each pair of subsets. The only exception is the risk of contagion within OWG, which is lower in the crisis period compared with the calm period, even though the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. 26 During the crisis, contagion among SWGs, and from them to EEB, tripled. Also contagion among EEBs and from EEBs to SWGs increased notably. Therefore, after global …nancial conditions changed in 2007, uncertainties about the risk of operations in EE and their adverse impact on banks' soundness seem to have contributed to a deeper stress in SWGs. At the same time, SWGs coming under increasing pressure from the global …nancial turmoil have heightened market participants' concerns about regional banks'shock-absorption capacities.
Our …ndings o¤er only mixed evidence on the existence of a direct ownership channel. In the crisis period, the percentage of signi…cant coe¢ cients 2 6 This result may re ‡ect the fact that the crisis started primarily as a leap in systemic risk in the banking systems of advanced economies, and among the largest banking groups idiosyncratic shocks were blurred by the markets' perception of an overall deterioration of banking system conditions, over and above direct and bilateral links, as shown also by the increased signi…cance of global funding conditions as explanatory variable (Table 7 , column 2). The same reasoning may be applied to the low increase in cross-contagion among SWGs and OWGs.
relative to subsidiaries in parent banks'regressions is 25% and it is not statistically di¤erent from the overall average for SWGs. On the other hand, about 40% of all coe¢ cients relative to parent banks in subsidiaries' regressions are signi…cant, a percentage much higher than the average for EEBs and this result seems to suggest that the banking group linkages may have played a role in the transmissions of contagion to Eastern European banking systems during the recent …nancial crisis. However, the weight of this channel should not be overstated, as signi…cant coe¢ cients relative to parent-subsidiaries linkages represent no more than 9% of all signi…cant coe¢ cients representing the subset of contagion e¤ects from SWGs to EEBs. Most importantly, the result that contagion from SWGs to EEB increased during the recent crisis is not statistically a¤ected by the presence of parent subsidiaries linkages, and would stand up even not considering signi…cant coe¢ cients related to this e¤ect.
Finally, the increase of co-excedances within EEB shows evidence of regional contagion. This e¤ect and contagion coming from SWGs may support a common lender explanation. 27 Our results come with some caveats. As we use lagged bank's idiosyncratic shocks in order to avoid a likely positive simultaneity bias, we may miss those cases of contagion taking place within one day. Some banks in our sample may play a signi…cant role in interbank markets or in global or local stock markets, suggesting that some common shock variables, such as conditional volatility, may in fact pick up e¤ects that are related to contagion. Our approach is rather conservative, as regards the testing procedure as well as the de…nition of co-exceedances, based on …ltered data, which may reduce the power of regressions to pick up contagion. 28 
Testing for emerging market contagion
In order to gain further insight into the transmission of shocks among Eastern and Western European banking systems we perform in this section a counterfactual experiment, replacing the sample of EEBs by an equal number of emerging market banks, all from South America, taken as a control group. Our goal is to test the hypothesis that, with respect to contagion from and to EEBs, our results re ‡ect speci…c e¤ects, associated to existing linkages with Western European banks, and do not re ‡ect a broader contagion to and from emerging markets. In order to run our experiment, we select 15 large Latin American banks (LAB), 4 of which belong to two European banking groups included in our sample (Table 9) . 2 7 The role of specialisation also emerges by comparing contagion to EEBs from the two subset of Western European banks. Contagion to EEBs from OWGs is signi…cantly lower than contagion from SWGs (the di¤erence between the two e¤ects is of 9 percentage points, signi…cant at a 10% level). Results are displayed in Table 10 , while in Table 11 we carry out a test for signi…cance of the di¤erences in contagion risks between the baseline model and the model with Latin American banks. Two results are worth noticing. In the crisis period contagion from SWGs to EEBs is signi…cantly higher than contagion to LABs. This, together with the circumstance that estimates of contagion among SWGs are not statistically di¤erent from the baseline, can be seen as evidence of robustness of our results regarding specialized Western groups. By contrast, contagion from EEBs to SWGs is higher than contagion from LABs to SWGs, but not signi…cantly di¤erent.
Overall, these two latter results suggest that while during the crisis regional specialisation of some European banks resulted in a higher level of contagion to Eastern European banking systems, there is much weaker evidence that contagion from Eastern Europe banks to Western European groups was any di¤erent than contagion from other emerging market. 29 
Conclusions
In this paper we use a stock market-based indicator, the distance to default, to highlight contagion risks in Western and Eastern European banking sectors. In the spirit of "extreme value theory", we identify wide variations in this measure as depicting major shocks in banks' …nancial conditions. Contagion occurs when the incidence of such tail events is associated to similar shocks hitting other banks in the previous period, after controlling for common factors. We distinguish between the period before and after the crisis, as, due to information problems, contagion risk may have heightened signi…cantly in the latter period. Improving on the literature, we introduce a testing procedure to measure changes in contagion e¤ects across di¤erent groups of banks and over time.
We …nd that before the recent …nancial crisis, contagion was generally contained to the largest Western European banking groups, while contagion from Western to Eastern Europe, and the reverse, was relatively less likely. The crisis has not only heightened the risks of cross-border contagion but also modi…ed their patterns. Contagion among Western European banks with the highest market share in the EE and from these group to Eastern European banks shows the largest increase in our sample. We also …nd evidence of contagion spreading from Eastern European banks to their Western European counterparts, but this result is much weaker, possibly re ‡ecting the presence of a broader phenomenon of contagion from emerging markets sources.
Our …ndings suggests that after global …nancial conditions changed in 2007, uncertainty about the risk stemming from operation in EE has swollen market participants'concerns about banks'shock-absorption capacities and have contributed to a deeper stress in the Western European banks with a strong market presence in EE as well as to Eastern European banks. This is not surprising, as since the onset of the crisis …nancial analysts have singled out EE as one of the riskiest regions among emerging market economies, less able to stand a sudden deterioration of global …nancial conditions.
In this paper, we do not explore the exact nature of the underlying transmission channels of contagion. Rather, our approach captures contagion as perceived by banks'equity holders, and its main advantage is to encompass all possible channels of transmissions, without relying on accurately measuring any particular one. Nevertheless, according to our results some channels were more likely than others during the crisis. For example, "runs" by equity holders have likely represented an important channel of propagation of contagion, as shocks seem to have propagated due to asymmetric information, with negative news about one bank triggering widespread sell-o¤s in stocks of other banks sharing similar business strategies. 30 Note: cell ij in the table shows the probability of observing at least one shock to a bank in group j at time t, given that no shock occurred in the bank group i at time t-1. Note: cell ij in the table shows the probability of observing at least one shock to a bank in group j at time t, given that at least a shock occurred in the bank group i at time t-1. Note: standard errors in parentheses; *, **,*** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Note: standard errors in parentheses; *, **,*** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
